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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question: How many municipalities in the United States prohibit all-night jiarking?
What are some of the principal reasons creating the need for such ordinances,
and what enforcement measures are employed when violation occurs? (From
Chief Carl Ekman, Evanston, Illinois.) -Answers in this number are by Dr.
David G. Monroe of the Northwestern University Traffic Safety Institute.
Answer.
There is a trend toward prohibition of
all-night parking on streets of municipali-
ties in the United States. Where ordi-
nances have illegalized all-night parking,
a number of situations lead to such pro-
hibitions. Difficulties in cleaning streets
and removing snow have been prime fac-
tors. Where exceptional weather condi-
tions prevail all-night parking regulations
are usually encountered. The mandatory
need for elimination of accident hazards
and facilitation of flow of traffic have been
factors of exceptional importance in na-
tionalizing all-night parking provisions.
Another factor is the need for combatting
theft of automobiles and accessories, and
identifying and returning stolen and aban-
doned cars. The history of all-night park-
ing legislation points to the exceptional
role which crime and emergencies have
exerted in developing such legislation. The
orgy of auto thievery in the late 1920's
and early 30's was an important factor.
The present war crisis, blackout and other
emergencies, and the anticipated wave of
tire thefts due to rubber shortage will
stimulate other measures. In addition to
these principal causes, there are others
which have promoted passage of such or-
dinances: they prevent use of streets for
storage purposes; prevent blocking of en-
trances to private property; improve the
general appearance of streets; aid in the
enforcement of curfew laws, and lessen
hazards from fog and other weather con-
ditions. Ordinances prohibiting all-night
parking appear most frequent in the
larger municipalities. An officer of the
American Municipal Association has esti-
mated that night parking ordinances are
in effect in at least one-half of the mu-
nicipalities of over 50,000 population. They
are the exception in smaller municipalities
and in the minor village, town and city
are almost non-existent. As to munici-
palities in the upper population brackets,
a survey made several years ago by the
Bureau of Municipal Research and Service,
University of Oregon, shows that such
ordinances have been passed in 41 of 44
cities of over 150,000 population.1
While some all-night parking ordinances
prohibit parking only in certain areas or
streets or arterial highways, the majority
eliminate parking in the municipal area.
With regard to time limits on night park-
ing, there is the widest variation. In some
instances (as in Seattle) parking for more
than one hour is a violation. Thirty min-
utes is the time limit in Detroit, four hours
in Minneapolis, etc. In many jurisdictions,
all night parking is permitted if fore and
rear lights or others are left on. Most
of the ordinances provide for tolerances.
The cars of physicians and persons on pub-
lic emergency service are nearly always
exempted from penalty.
Enforcement policies and practices vary
exceptionally. Rigid enforcement is most
frequent in communities where partial
prohibitions are in effect. Parking on nar-
row streets is rigorously checked in Cleve-
land. In Grand Rapids, regulations are
enforced primarily with regard to snow
removal. The parking ban in Akron ap-
plying to industrial districts is rigorously
enforced. In Birmingham and Louisville
where restrictions apply to downtown dis-
tricts, enforcement is the rule. In general,
however, opposition engendered by sys-
tematic, city-wide observation, coupled
with the cost of supervision has bogged
enforcement in many jurisdictions.
Among penalties, tagging is most exten-
IRegulation of all-night parcing oan City
Streets, Information Bulletin No. 32, May, 139.
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sively employed. Ordinances seldom pro-
vide for impounding vehicles so far as can
be ascertained. Usually, the first tag is a
warning; subsequent ones mean a court
appearance. In Buffalo, after three tags
are issued to one person, he receives a
summons. As to provisions for impound-
ing, those of Cincinnati and Hamtramck
are illustrative.2 In the former, impound-
ing is permitted if a vehicle has been
parked for more than one hour in excess
of time allowed or in the event that ci-
tation tags for two or more traffic ordi-
nance violations have been ignored. The
impounded vehicle may be redeemed on
payment of a service charge of $5.00 and
a storage charge of 20c per day for the im-
pounding period. The Hamtramck ordi-
nance not only prescribes certain im-
pounding costs but gives the city a lien
for the costs. If they are not paid in 60
days, the vehicle may be sold by the po-
lice department at a constable's sale after
due public notice.
Question: When we employ chemical tests to determine whether or not a person
is intoxicated, the defense usually raises the objection that such tests violate
the defendants constitutional rights as to self-incrimination. What can be done
to overcome this objection?
Answer:
In the first place, the constitutional
provision (i.e., that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself) refers only to
testimonial utterances. In other words,
you can not abstract from a person's lips
an admission of his guilt. But a person
may be compelled to supply a variety of
physical evidences which may furnish
incriminating evidence of prime impor-
tance. Of these, finger-prints and photo-
graphs are examples. These have been
admitted over the self-incrimination ob-
jection on the ground that no fears, no
hopes, no will of the person can falsify,
or exaggerate such evidence. The evidence
speaks for itself, not the person. The
same argument could be used with regard
to evidence of intoxication secured by
chemical tests. In time, as chemical tests
of the urine, blood, saliva and breath
become generally recognized and ap-
proved, it is quite probable that judicial
opinion as regards use of compulsion in
taking fingerprints and the like will be
extended to chemical testing. However,
at present, the courts generally hold that
use of the slightest compulsion in forcing
a person to submit to a chemical test will
thereby violate his privilege against self-
incrimination.
But it should be remembered that self-
incrimination is only a privilege and not
a right. Hence, voluntary submission to
a test voids the privilege. By all means
attempt to secure the testing with the
consent of the accused. In the event that
the person refuses, some courts permit
evidence of such refusal to be introduced
in court. Perhaps the most notable
progress toward compulsory taking of
chemical tests will come from an exten-
sion of the principle that operation of an
automobile upon the public highways is
not a right but only a privilege which the
state may grant or withdraw at pleasure.
Even now, a driver may be compelled, in
the event of automobile accident, to report
the accident to enforcement officials. It
would seem a reasonable extension of the
principle to uphold a statute requiring a
suspected drunken driver to give a sam-
ple of his blood, urine, saliva or breath.
Question: In taking a dying declaration, what conditions must be satisfied before a
court will admit the declaration-as evidence?
Answer:
In order to be valid, a dying declara-
tion must meet these tests: (1) the
declarant must be dying. (2) He must
know that he is dying. (3) He must have
given up all hope of recovery. (4) He
must die. (5) The declaration can be
used only at the criminal 'homicide trial
for the death of the deceased.
2Consult section 74-134 of the Cincinnati Ordi-
nance (1934), and sec. 73 of the Hamtramck Ordi-
nance (No. 96).
